动物防疫各方委托代理关系分析
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

S851

基金项目:


Analysis on the Principal-agent Relationship among Related Parties Involved in Animal Disease Prevention and Control
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    动物强制免疫是重要的动物防疫政策,推进强制免疫“先打后补”是当前动物防疫部门的重要任务。本文通过回顾以往对地方政府职责、中央地方关系的研究,基于委托代理理论,构建行业管理体系中,中央政府及其部门与地方、基层政府及其部门,以及与最终委托人之间的基本模型,分析其中目标不一致、信息不对称导致的张力。在此基础上,分析动物强制免疫补助实施方式,提出对策建议,并将讨论引向类似行业管理体系的共性问题。

    Abstract:

    Compulsory vaccination is an important policy for animal disease prevention. The“vaccination followed by compensation”is an important task of animal disease prevention and control departments. By reviewing the previous researches on the responsibilities of local governments and the relationship between central and local governments,and based on the principal-agent theory,a basic model of the relationship between central government or its departments and local governments,grass-roots governments or their departments as well as end clients was constructed under the industry management system,and the tension caused by inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information was analyzed. On this basis,the implementation mode of animal compulsory vaccination subsidy policy was analyzed,countermeasures and suggestions were put forward,and the common problems of public administration system in similar fields was discussed.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

颜起斌.动物防疫各方委托代理关系分析[J].《中国动物检疫》编辑部,2022,39(6):62-68.

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:
  • 最后修改日期:
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: 2022-06-06
  • 出版日期:
您是第位访问者
《中国动物检疫》编辑部 ® 2022 版权所有
地址:山东省青岛市南京路369号《中国动物检疫》编辑部 邮编:266032
电话:0532-85623545 0532-85622559 0532-85642906 传真:0532-85621826 鲁ICP备08016398号-3
技术支持:北京勤云科技发展有限公司